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Abstract
Adversaries employ malware against victims of cyber espionage with the intent of
gaining unauthorized access to information. To that end, malware authors intentionally
attempt to evade defensive countermeasures based on static methods. This thesis analyzes
a dynamic analysis methodology for malware triage that applies at the enterprise scale.
This study captures behavior reports from 64,987 samples of malware randomly
selected from a large collection and 25,591 clean executable files from operating system
install media. Function call information in sequences of behavior generate feature vectors
from behavior reports from the files. The results of 64 experiment combinations indicate
that using more informed behavior features yields better performing models with this data
set. The decision tree classifier attained a max performance of 0.999 area under the ROC
curve and 99.4% accuracy using argument information with function sequence lengths
from 11–14.
This methodology contributes to strategic cyber situation awareness by fusion with
fast malware detection methods, such as static analysis, to change the game of malware
triage in favor of cyber defense. This method of triage reduces the number of false alarms
from automatic analysis that allows a 97% workload reduction over using a static method
alone.
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LEARNING ENTERPRISE MALWARE TRIAGE FROM AUTOMATIC DYNAMIC
ANALYSIS
I. Introduction
Malware plagues enterprise networks. Malware authors intentionally attempt toevade defensive countermeasures. These adversaries employ malware against
victims of cyber espionage with the intent of gaining unauthorized access to information
or performing other malicious behavior such as corrupting data or denying access to
information. As long as it is possible to use malware to achieve gain, then adversaries
will attempt to introduce malware into enterprise cyber infrastructures (ECIs) [15].
Cyber defenders deploy a variety of responses to mitigate the threat of malware.
To counteract signature-based malware detection, such as antivirus products and static
analysis, malware authors implement a variety of obfuscation techniques that change
the digital “appearance” of malware while preserving malicious behavior [9, 28, 31].
Initial results indicate that a dynamic analysis of malware can reveal malware hidden to
static analysis by intentional obfuscation by observing the actual behavior of executable
files [21, 26]. Furthermore, a dynamic analysis approach is significantly different from a
static analysis approach such that one can refine the results of the other. That is, applying
a dynamic method to the results of a previous static method can reduce the false alarms of
both methods together for a more efficient malware detection system [6].
Manual review of large sets of dynamic analysis reports remains unfeasible because
an enterprise network contains hundreds of thousands of unique executable files. Malware
triage seeks to reduce the workload of the available cyber analysts by detecting the files
that most closely resemble malware.
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A given ECI contains executable files from a variety of sources. Operating systems
install some executable files at install time or during updates, and others reside as part of
an application that provides some set of features. Some applications directly support the
requirements of the users of the ECI, while other applications provide a variety of security
services, such as antivirus software, anti-spyware software or host-based intrusion detection
system software. Another source of executable files on ECIs is administrative programs
such as application installers or remote management software. Each application contains a
set of executable files that interact together to provide the service of the application. Thus,
each executable file behaves in a certain way, and there are a large variety of acceptable
behaviors present from executable files on a typical ECI.
Additionally, some ECIs contain malicious executable files that provide a service to
unauthorized users. Adversaries specifically program such executable files to perform
malicious behaviors and covertly introduce them to the ECI. Examples include remote
control of resources, information stealing or destructive actions. Cyber defenders must
detect and remove these malicious executables in order to continue to meet the mission
requirements of the enterprise.
This thesis examines the effects of feature extraction and selection on enterprise-level
malware triage, and provides a methodology for behavioral analysis of unknown executable
files with the goal of detecting malicious executables. Furthermore, this methodology
contributes to strategic cyber situation awareness by combining with fast malware detection
methods, such as static analysis, to change the game of malware triage in favor of cyber
defense.
Analysis of the experiments validates using both application programming interface
(API) argument information and behavior sequences of lengths from 11–14 to build
more accurate executable classification models, and does not find a significant benefit
of normalization. Given the high accuracy of 99.4% correct and low false positive rate
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of 1.75%, this method presents a prime candidate for a middle level dynamic method in a
malware target recognition (MaTR) architecture [7].
Following is a summary of contributions of this thesis:
• critical analysis of recent automatic malware analysis research including a compari-
son to this study (Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4),
• analysis and discussion of results from 64 experiments on 3 key parameters of
behavior analysis feature generation that the literature does not cover in a detailed
manner (Chapter 4), and
• analysis of the contribution to a malware target recognition architecture by this
dynamic analysis method, which establishes the feasibility of automatic behavior
analysis at the enterprise scale (Sections 4.5 and 5.2).
This thesis covers a number of considerations for cyber defenders to prudently design
a malware detection system, including the following summary. Cyber defenders using a
malware detection system must:
• match the analysis sandbox environment to the enterprise environment,
• tailor the training set to the types of threats that face the particular enterprise,
• select features to represent the unique behaviors of benign and malicious programs,
• use an efficient dynamic analysis component,
• experiment with around eight levels of parameters when retraining,
• keep the number of training validation repetitions less than 10 (e.g. use 3 or 1),
• analyze the independence of the methods in different MaTR tiers, and
• add additional domain-specific information to the model (as possible).
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II. Literature Review
This chapter introduces the background of machine learning (Section 2.1) and malwareanalysis (Section 2.2) before surveying recent research in dynamic analysis and
automatic behavior classification (Section 2.3).
2.1 Machine Learning
The field of Machine learning involves using theories of statistics, algorithms, and
knowledge representation to automatically represent information in a digital model of the
real world. The classification process involves building a model on two or more distinct
classes of training samples, and the model then attempts to predict the class of test samples.
Decision trees build a classification model by repeatedly bisecting the input space based
on a single attribute at a time. The tree building algorithm chooses the attribute that is
most likely to evenly cut the space by measuring the information gain of all the available
attributes according to the class labels. The support vector machine (SVM) algorithm finds
a nonlinear classification boundary by selecting training samples that minimize the distance
to the boundary [8]. The Wakaito Environment for Knowledge Acquisition (WEKA)
platform provides implementations of many machine learning algorithms including J48,
which implements the C4.5 decision tree algorithm [13, 24, 32].
Where classification uses training data that comes with class labels, clustering does
not need to start with labels in order to put samples into groups. With clustering, a selected
similarity measure (based on what makes sense for the data set) determines the relative
distance between samples. Then the chosen algorithm dictates how the measurements shall
determine which samples belong together in clusters. The hierarchical clustering with
complete linkage (HCL) method finds the shortest distance between two existing clusters
then combines the clusters by linking one sample from each cluster that maximizes the
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distance between those two samples. After repeating that algorithm until all the samples
link to a single cluster a provided threshold cuts the resulting tree relationship into a set of
clusters that each have a height that is no greater than the threshold [32].
Other learning algorithms, weak learners, perform only slightly better than random
guessing (accuracy slightly above 50% correct for a two-class problem). Ensembles of
weak learners combine many weak learners, each learning a different part of a problem
to create a better-performing model [17]. Weak learners are fast to develop and execute,
but some developers exert more research effort into developing a learning algorithm with
more heuristics, which means they apply domain knowledge to solving part of the problem
ahead of time. The resulting models perform better than weak learners, although more
complicated learners necessarily have a higher computational cost [33].
In this effort, pilot studies show that decision trees perform better than bagging or
boosting decision stumps and similarly to bagging or boosting decision trees. Ensembles
of decision stumps train more quickly than decision trees, but decision trees train faster
than ensembles of decision trees because each ensemble trains 10 models internally.
The practice of k-fold cross validation for building a robust classification model
involves randomly splitting the training sample set into k equally-sized folds of samples.
Then the learning algorithm builds a model with a training set of (k − 1) folds, leaving one
fold out. Then the algorithm uses the left-out fold as a testing set. Since the algorithm does
not train the model with any samples from the test set during an iteration, the unknown
samples validly measure the generality of the model. This process repeats k times, and
each fold becomes the test set for one iteration. Stratified cross validation maintains class
distributions throughout the method so that the relative size of the classes persists through
different folds.
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2.2 Static Analysis
A static analysis process reveals some attributes of an executable file without
executing the code. As a result, the process quickly provides moderate detail. Egele
et al. discuss various techniques for automatically analyzing malware and tools that
implement such techniques [9]. Static analysis suffers from generic vulnerabilities
to obfuscation by targeted malware. Moser et al. shows an approach for program
transformation that defeats static analysis methods [21].
Eskandari and Hashemi combine a control flow graph (CFG) from disassembly
information with an application programming interface (API) set to attain 97.77% accuracy
on a set of 2,140 benign files from Microsoft Windows XP SP3 and 2,305 “network worms”
from a repository at Shiraz University [10]. A CFG represents the possible actions that
the program could take upon execution. They compare the 97.77% from CFG analysis
to 92.19% accuracy using static n-grams as features. Both experiments use random forests
on the same sample set. To get around the high processing time from the large graphs
of CFG analysis, they flatten each graph into a feature vector using a sparse matrix
representation. Disassembly-based information obtains fine-grained information, but it
remains vulnerable to obfuscation. The paper does not report how much time the method
takes for collection or analysis.
T.E. Dube attains 99.92% detection accuracy on a set of 31,193 samples of 32-bit
malware from VX Heavens and 25,195 benign files from a clean install of Microsoft
Windows from vendor media [7]. In comparison with the Kolter and Maloof n-gram
method, Dube’s malware target recognition (MaTR) static method performs significantly
more accurately at the 95% confidence level [16]. In his experiments, the best commercial
antivirus product fails to achieve 50% accuracy on an unknown malware set. In addition,
Dube’s static method averages less than one second of scan time for each file, whereas even
the fastest antivirus product tested takes 43 seconds on average. Dube attains this result by
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deriving the feature set from proven static features using expert domain knowledge instead
of the computationally heavy n-gram method.
Furthermore, Dube proposes a tiered architecture for cyber situation awareness [6].
In order to triage large amounts of unknown executable files, the bottom tier uses very
fast methods that achieve a low false negative rate. When the bottom tier flags a sample
as potentially malicious then the sample becomes an input to methods in the middle tier.
The middle tier methods still have high detection rates, but also have low false positive
rates, because the results from those methods go to cyber analysts at the top tier. Any false
positives that reach the top tier are wasted overhead for the analysts, so the false positive
rates of the underlying methods provide a way to directly measure the expected waste from
overhead. This thesis (Section 5.2) provides insight into a behavior analysis method that
fits into the middle tier of such an architecture to improve response times of cyber defenders
by reducing the workload.
2.3 Dynamic Analysis
An appropriate dynamic analysis of an executable file reveals the most definitive
information about its actions. Rossow et al. suggest some standard practices for malware
experiment design such as removing benign programs from malware collections and
commenting on the containment of the samples [27]. Bayer et al. introduce TTAnalyze
(now Anubis, which also analyzes Android APK files), which uses Qemu emulation with
Windows XP [4, 5]. TTAnalyze successfully reproduces and captures detailed data about
the behavior of the executable file under analysis. TTAnalyze collects data at the level of the
emulated processor, but it bridges the semantic gap with a kernel driver that leverages the
CR3 register and a userland process inside the guest. This means that the analysis method
is able to obtain information about the state of the operating system to allow the process to
correctly interpret the low-level instructions.
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Yin et al. employ a whole system fine-grained dynamic taint analysis in Panorama [34].
Taint tracking labels the memory address to where a function returns a value, then records
when another function uses that value as input or changes the value by writing into the
same location again. This tracking allows a low-level emulator to gain insight into how
programs interact with the operating system and produce a behavior report for the sand-
box system. It collects information from an emulator on the entire guest system including
high-level API calls and operating system interaction as well as an instruction trace with
taint tracking. The system includes automated user actions during analysis such as typing
text and browsing URLs. Upon testing with 42 malware samples and 56 benign samples,
Panorama detects all the malware and only reports 3 false positives.
Egele et al. survey the literature on dynamic analysis techniques, tools, and analysis,
but do not cover Cuckoo Sandbox, Windows 7 guests or 64-bit guests [9]. When a dynamic
system analyzes an unknown executable file, the system may be able to choose which guest
system is appropriate. If a malware author targets Windows 7, then the malware may not
behave the same if the analysis system executes the file in Windows XP because of API
differences between the versions. A similar phenomenon occurs with 64-bit malware on
a 32-bit analysis system.
Moser et al. explores multiple execution paths during dynamic analysis by taking note
of branching points and keeping track of the current state of execution [20]. Building
on Anubis, Moser completes one iteration of execution, then reverts back to one of the
branching points to continue analysis down a different path. This method can theoretically
find behaviors of a sample that may not surface otherwise, such as behaviors that require
user input or that wait for a specific time. However such completeness comes at the cost
of computation time according the inherent branching factor of the program, which is how
many alternate execution paths the program exhibits.
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Lindorfer et al. attempt to Disarm malware that evades dynamic analysis [18]. Disarm
works by submitting the samples to four different sandboxes and comparing the behavior
reports. The findings indicate that several approaches produce a useful comparison for
detecting anomalies [19]. Some malware authors include a capability to evade a certain
analysis environment, but Lindorfer shows that most evading malware samples fail to evade
in all environments under test. With a set of 1,686 samples, Disarm flags 431 (26%) as
potentially evasive. Detailed analysis indeed finds timing attacks against Anubis to which
a more plain Qemu sandbox is not vulnerable because it runs much faster. Other samples
evade Anubis by exiting if execution starts with explorer.exe as the parent process.
Lindorfer did note some false positives resulting from a peculiar (but not evasive) behavior
by a certain family of malware.
2.3.1 API Call Sequences.
Trinius et al. introduce a malware instruction set (MIST), which is a feature generation
technique that robustly represents a behavior action as a series of integers [29]. The API
call name maps to an integer that represents a general category and another that uniquely
represents that call name. The arguments also map to a hierarchical set of numbers that
sequentially reveal more detailed information from left to right. Trinius also demonstrates
feature selection over that representation by taking a level of numbers from the beginning
of the malware instruction set (MIST) records as the training information while leaving
out the rest of the data. As the level grows larger, the samples becomes more robust by
including more detailed information. However, including too much specific information
can reduce generality.
Rieck et al. takes a certain number of these segments in sequence to represent a chunk
of behavior as a q-gram [26]. As in the Rieck paper, this thesis refers to sequences of
behavior grams as q-grams, and uses the term n-grams to refer to bytes of binary data from
the static method as in Kolter and Maloof. The MIST approach with behavior sequences
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allows researchers to tailor the level of analysis to the available computing resources. Using
a larger q-gram representation exploits more details about the behavior of the executable
file, but processing the data takes more space and time.
Each relevant API call belongs to a more general category. For instance, all the API
calls that interact with the filesystem belong together, and all API calls that interact with
the network interface belong together. Each category maps to an integer, and each specific
call within each category maps to another set of integers. For example, the filesystem
category is number 03 and the MoveFile API call is number 04 within that category.
Therefore, the MIST report contains an entry 03 04 whenever a program moves a file.
Sequences of instructions, q-grams, across the training set yield useful distance metrics
between executable files for clustering and classification.
gram 09 02, 09 05
word category API
09 02 registry OpenKey
09 05 registry QueryValue
Figure 2.1: An example of a 2-gram at MIST level 1 with description of components
Figure 2.1 displays an example a 2-gram. The gram 09 02 refers to the registry API
call OpenKey, and the gram 09 05 refers to the QueryValue API call which is also in the
registry category. Hence, the 2-gram 09 02, 09 05 refers to the behavior of opening a
registry key then querying a registry value. Without argument information, it is impossible
to discern whether the executable is querying the value of the key that it just opened or if
the query targets a different registry key.
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03 05 00000001 00dc3932 00a93b39 002c392d ba92d7c6
MoveFile flags source file ext source file path dest file file dest file path
Figure 2.2: An example of a 1-gram at MIST level 2 with description of components
At MIST level 2, the grams include a level of function argument information.
Figure 2.2 shows an example of a 1-gram at MIST level 2. First, the 03 05 part refers
to the filesystem API MoveFile. Then there is a series of hash-encoded components that
represent different parts of the argument information. MIST level 2 contains the more
generic arguments, which would be common within a family of malware, but not arguments
that are likely to be specific to a specific variant. For the MoveFile API, for example, the
generic arguments include
• flags that represent filesystem move options,
• the source file, which includes
the file extension and
the path in the file system (not including the file name), and
• the destination file location, which also includes
the file extension and
the path.
On the other hand, MIST level 2 does not include the actual file base names. Such specifics
would fall into a MIST level 3. Not every API call requires the same number of arguments,
so only the arguments that are present in the behavior report get encoded into MIST format.
This representation also allows effectiveness of geometric clustering techniques,
which Rieck et al. show performs efficiently [26]. When using prototypes for clustering,
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Rieck reports that a quad-core Opteron 2.4GHz system processes at a rate of 15,000 reports
per day and uses 5GB of memory during regular clustering.
2.3.2 Behavior Analysis.
Rieck et al. implement hierarchical clustering with Euclidean distance complete
linkage (HCL) [26]. Training starts with 3,133 samples from Sunbelt Software that come
from 24 malware families that each have no more than 300 members. This labelled training
set forms a reference to start the clustering process. After clustering on a set of 33,698
samples the algorithm finds 434 clusters which each contain 69 reports on average. Rieck
shows high consistency of the top ten clusters with respect to Kaspersky labels, which
indicates that the clusters represent the differing families of malware by behavior. Rieck
explains that the majority of inconsistency that does occur comes from antivirus industry
labels. The Rieck paper does not provide time measurements for collecting the dynamic
analysis data.
Bailey et al. perform single-linkage hierarchical clustering on malware behavior [2].
They use a high-level view of behavior, recording only the non-transient changes to the
system that persist after execution completes. For example, a malware file might enumerate
the file system to get all the filenames present on the system then write those filenames to
a file. Such behavior would be of value to an adversarial intelligence operative. Only the
output file persists as evidence of the behavior of the malware, and the transient activity
of the filesystem enumeration does not factor into their analysis. Bailey claims that this
method avoids obfuscation of static analysis and low-level API sequences. They use the
Backtracker system in VMware with Windows XP. They collect behavior data from 3,698
malware samples from the Arbor Malware Library (AML) over six months [1].
The O(N2) normalized compression distance step of the Bailey process takes the most
time in both time and memory space as the number of samples rises to 500, compared to
the preprocessing and clustering steps. The whole process takes about 220 seconds and
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only 300MB of memory for 526 samples. On a 3, 698 sample set, the method finds 403
clusters. Since 311 files do not exhibit any behavior during the process, Bailey claims
a 91.6% detection rate, and then compares that detection rate to a 51.5% detection rate
of Symantec. The report lists the common limitations of dynamic analysis, but does not
assign a root cause to any of the files that failed to behave during observation. Bailey et
al. do not run the process on non-malicious files to compare how closely other executable
files compare to malicious files or to measure false positive tendencies of the high-level
method [2].
Bayer et al. cluster 75,000 behavior reports within three hours and four gigabytes of
memory with an Anubis system extended with taint tracking [3, 5]. As above, taint tracking
labels the memory address to where a function returns a value, then records when another
function uses that value as input or changes the value by writing into the same location
again. This tracking allows a low-level emulator to gain insight into how programs interact
with the operating system and produce a behavior report for the sandbox system. The
blazing performance is due to the locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) clustering algorithm
which approximates the distance measurements to achieve a good result quickly that is
within a threshold parameter of the optimal solution.
Hu presents a malware detection system MutantX and a malware clustering system
Duet [14]. The Duet dynamic analysis component uses binary features of n-grams of
system calls from strace call traces (q-grams). This method employs the system call
name and a canonical category to inform each datum, leaving out information from call
arguments, which is similar to MIST level 1 [29]. The method does not specify how many
features to select. Hu performs both static and dynamic analysis on 5,647 malware samples,
and normalizes the feature vectors onto the unit circle. The static method computes n-grams
of instruction sequences from a disassembly of the executable file. Hu notes that static
analysis fails on 655 samples, while dynamic analysis fails on 645 samples. However,
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only with 72 samples do both methods fail. Comparing successful processing of samples
using static 3- and 4-grams and dynamic 3- and 4-grams with combined behavior and static
features, Hu finds 10%–15% improvement in successful processing with the combined
information. This method fusion brings the clustering method to 98.72% coverage (72
samples failed of 5,647).
2.4 Summary
This thesis analyzes aspects of several other efforts. Table 2.1 summarizes similarities
and differences of this and other works. None of those studies take advantage of as
large a sample set, although Rieck is the closest with about a third as many, and none
obtain samples from OpenMalware or US-CERT. Of the researchers that pursue a dynamic
analysis approach, only Bailey does not capture API calls, instead noting only the persistent
changes to the sandbox that remain following execution of the sample.
Two other of those efforts make classification between two or more sets a goal, while
three seek to cluster a single body of samples by measuring similarity. One who choses
to cluster implements an ensemble learning method, and one that classifies implements an
ensemble (of a different sort). This study does not use ensemble methods because pilot
tests show that fast ensembles are not as accurate as decision trees and accurate ensembles
are slower than decision trees.
The details of these comparative studies reside in Table 2.2, where only one other uses
a MIST representation for feature generation. Indeed, that research is first to publish the
MIST, and while some other papers note the MIST in citations, none publish work that
implements it. Only Kolter and Maloof use nearly as long gram structures, although that
research uses static grams rather than behavior-based grams. Also, using long grams means
the feature space gets very large, and only this study and Kolter and Maloof employ feature
selection. Three papers mention normalizing feature vectors, but only this work publishes
a comparison of normalized and non-normalized results.
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Most of the studies use the same sorts of machine learning techniques. The k-nearest-
neighbors (kNN) algorithm is popular both for clustering and classification, and the other
clustering studies use HCL. The other two classification studies make a point to compare
the common algorithms of naı̈ve Bayes (NB) and SVM with the J48 decision tree in
WEKA. Firdausi adds a multilayer perceptron (MLP) classifier to the model comparison,
which trains in acceptable time with as few of samples in that study.
The set of studies that the summary tables cover is not exhaustive of all malware
detection research, but the tables do contain the primary publications to date that bear
major points in common with the research reported in this thesis.
Table 2.1: Overview summary of related work. An asterisk (*) denotes similarity to this
research.
Author(s) analysis N source features learning ensemble
Bristow dynamic 90,578 OM/USCERT API classify no
Rieck [26] dynamic* 33,698* CWS API* cluster no
Hu [14] both 5,647 Symantec instructions+API* cluster vote/bag
Bailey [2] dynamic* 3,698 AML persistent cluster no
Kolter [16] static 3,622 MECS n-grams classify* boosting
Firdausi [11] dynamic* 470 Anubis behavior;not specific classify* no
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Table 2.2: Detailed summary of related work. An asterisk (*) denotes similarity to this
research.
Author(s) l n M norm model result
Bristow 1,2 1-16 500 both J48 99.4% acc., 0.999 AUC
Rieck [26] 1,2* 1-4 sparse/all yes HCL 80% recall
Hu [14] 1 3,4 all yes kNN 70% covg., 0.9 prec.
Bailey [2] NA 1 all no HCL 91.6% acc.
Kolter [16] NA 1-10* 10-10,000* no kNN,NB,SVM,J48* 0.9958 AUC
Firdausi [11] 1 1 116&11 no kNN,NB,SVM,J48*,MLP 96.8% acc.
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III. Methodology
Binary files execute a sequence of application programming interface (API) calls.This sequence represents the behavior of the executable file [26]. Let each API
call along with the arguments represent one action. If a program writes to a file in the
Windows operating system, the first action is to call the CreateFile API with arguments
that identify the file to open for writing. On success, the API call returns a valid handle to
the open file. With the handle, the program then calls the WriteFile API to put data into
the file. A benign word processing program uses these API calls to save a users file, but
some malicious programs use these API calls to save a record of keystrokes without user
knowledge.
3.1 Problem Definition
The specific sequence of API calls defines the behavior of a program. Certain
sequences occur in legitimate software, but to some extent different sequences occur in
malware. This study examines the effects of malware instruction set (MIST) feature
generation on enterprise-level malware triage.
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The goal of this research is to determine an efficient and effective method to detect
malware. The hypothesis is that certain feature selection parameter levels lead to machine
learning performing with higher accuracy and efficiency at detecting malware compared to
other levels.
This thesis addresses the following:
• Strategic Goal: Detect malware efficiently and effectively.
• Tactical Goal: Evaluate machine learning schemes for executable file classification.
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• Hypothesis: Certain parameter levels enable more effective malicious file identifica-
tion.
3.1.2 Approach.
The approach of this effort is to compare the efficiency and effectiveness of machine
learning techniques with various levels of key feature selection parameters at classifying
executable files. This study employs the MIST feature generation technique to encode
behavior report information into a hierarchical format [26].
The experimental levels provide the basis for comparison relative to the same input
sample set. The sample set results from random sampling of the large set. Standard
techniques such as antivirus or previous analysis results validate the large sample set as
malicious or not.
3.2 System Boundaries
The System under Test (SUT) in this experiment is a Malware Detection System
(MDS). The MDS accepts a workload of known, labeled training sample executable
files or unknown executable files, and it provides a malware detection service that
identifies executable files which display malicious behavior. The dynamic analysis engine
component creates dynamic analysis reports based on observed events. The feature
generation component translates the behavior reports into MIST format and generates
q-grams before selecting the most useful grams as features by filtering by information gain.
The behavior analysis component is the Component under Test (CUT), which accepts sets
of feature vectors and provides malware detection and classification capability. The block
diagram in Figure 3.1 depicts the SUT and its components.
While this study measures the timing of a specific dynamic analysis engine known
as Cuckoo Sandbox using VirtualBox, comparing timing measurements of different
implementations is outside the scope of this study [12, 22]. The rest of the system
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Figure 3.1: Malware Detection System Component Diagram
does not rely on a specific dynamic analysis engine implementation since all known
implementations have the potential to create behavior reports that meet the requirements
of the MIST feature generation technique. Similarly, this study does not depend on a
specific computing platform. While this research effort validates this method on Microsoft
Windows XP Service Pack 3 virtual guests, the concept extends to all other common
operating systems where API call observation is possible through analogous methods.
3.3 System Services
The malware detection system detects malware within a set of unknown executable
files by building a model from information the system discovers in a training set of
executable files. A set of non-malicious benign files and a set of known malware samples
comprise the training sample set. The system outputs a cryptographic hash of the
executable file (for identification) along with the class label as the classifier determines.
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The class labels derive from the labels correlated with the known training sample set. Thus,
the approach is an example of supervised learning.
The success outcome is when the class label is correct for an executable file. A failure
outcome is when the class label is incorrect. For failures, either the label indicates that
the executable file is malicious when it is in fact benign, which is an example of a false
positive, or the label indicates a benign file that is in fact malicious, an example of a false
negative. False negatives are undesirable because they represent a missed opportunity to
detect a malicious program, which means that an adversary retains the capability provided
by that program. The false positive rate of a malware detection system allows operators to
calculate how much wasted overhead the analysts must manually review.
The system discards samples if there is not enough behavior in a report and is therefore
not desirable for input to clustering or classification algorithms. The cutoff threshold of the
number of actions required is a result of applying domain knowledge and inspecting the
smallest reports to find an appropriate level. There are 4,038 out of 90,578 total samples in
this study that do not perform any actions. If a malware sample does not display behavior,
then there is either some difference between the malware target environment and the test
environment, or the sample simply does not perform any behavior. The system need not
learn from nor detect malware samples that do not perform any behavior. Cyber defenders
must take steps to ensure that a test environment matches the target environment in the
enterprise in order to ensure that malware targeted for that enterprise performs behavior in
the test environment.
Another failure outcome occurs when no features from the selection list of the top
features, by information gain, that come from a sample. Such samples do not contribute
information to that specific level of parameter levels. Thus a drawback exists from limiting
the number of features. On the other hand, there exist millions of potential features at
higher MIST levels and q-gram lengths, requiring feature vectors to reside in a space
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with hundreds of millions of dimensions. This curse of dimensionality requires attention
when cyber analysts select a feature selection method for a machine learning scheme. This
method deals with the large number of potential features by selecting the top 500 features
according to information gain.
3.4 Workload
The workload this study provides to the SUT represents a set of executable files
from an enterprise cyber infrastructure (ECI). A cryptographic hash of the contents of
an executable file identifies the file in the workload. Identifying files by hash allows
the system to treat two executable files that differ by a single bit or more as separate.
Although file source data such as filename and source host are available to host analysis
teams, such data are outside the scope of this experiment. A default installation of the
Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 3 operating system contains thousands of unique
binary executable files, and a newly installed application may contain one to hundreds of
executable files. Additionally, each update applied to an operating system or application
adds or modifies one to hundreds of executable files at a time. Such updates introduce
variability to a given ECI. Therefore, the distribution of input executable files to the SUT
strongly depends on the individual ECI. The sample set consists of benign software samples
similar to the most generic ECI. The distribution of specific software products does not
necessarily affect the overall performance of a learned model because different versions of
software that accomplish the same generic service likely exhibit similar behavior.
A current limitation of the Cuckoo Sandbox configuration pushes the ability to
operate 64-bit guests outside the scope of this research, but the Cuckoo Sandbox developer
intend to provide 64-bit capability in the future. Thus, this study uses 32-bit executable
file samples in a 32-bit Windows XP SP3 guest. Cyber operators should ensure that the
sample set for an operational malware detection system includes samples germane to the
operational cyber infrastructure.
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This study uses a set of malware from the US-CERT and Open Malware malware
collections, which reflect many types of malware, including backdoors, constructors,
sniffers, droppers, spyware, viruses, worms and trojans [25, 30]. This research randomly
selects a subset of 64,987 32-bit Windows (Portable Executable format) malware samples
from this large collection.
The whiteware set includes executable files from operating system vendor media,
with the assumption that these executable files do not perform malicious behavior. Cyber
defenders must add additional whiteware samples from installations of common types of
user applications that occur in the enterprise cyber infrastructure. The white samples for
this study originate from known clean Microsoft Windows media from Windows 2000 to
Windows 7. This study uses a total number of 25,591 whiteware samples, and the total
number of samples in the data set comes to 90,578.
The large number of malware samples from a very large collection precludes a detailed
analysis of malware families within the scope of this study. However, this research uses a
large number of samples randomly selected from a collection that contains a wide variety
of malware. Therefore, the training set of malware executables has the potential to contain
a wide variety of unique malicious behaviors. Other studies show that malware families
usually perform similar behaviors, so whichever variants randomly appear in the training
set contribute to the available training information for the learning algorithm. It is possible
that a large malware family randomly present in the training set could introduce a bias
toward detecting that family, however if such a family is more prevalent in the wild then
detecting that family is a desirable trait. Operationally, cyber defenders should tailor the
training set to the types of threats that face the particular enterprise.
3.5 Performance Metrics
The performance of the SUT comes from several measurements. The classification
accuracy rate (%acc) of the malware detection model is the number of correctly-classified
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samples divided by the total sample size (percent correct). The false positive rate (FPR)
is relevant for evaluating how many files the cyber analysts must manually review. The
false negative rate (FNR) indicates the importance of a defense in depth strategy including
alternative detection capabilities. A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve of a
classifier graphs the true positive rate versus the false positive rate. Comparing several ROC
curves shows the relative tradeoffs in false positives and false negatives. This study uses the
area under the ROC curve (AUC), which is a summary of the ROC curve for a classifier,
because it is simpler to compare 64 experimental classifiers by AUC than attempting to
display and view all 64 ROC curve plots. Some relative false negative and false positive
information is available in a full ROC plot that is not available in the AUC summary, but
the AUC is suitable for this study.
In addition, the throughput of the SUT is the number of files that the system processes
per unit time. The training time is the time the system requires to build a model from
a specific machine learning technique with a given training set and feature selection
parameter level.
3.6 System Parameters
Many parameters impact the performance of the SUT. The specific implementation
of the dynamic analysis (DA) engine, feature generation component and machine learning
component each require inspection of several relevant parameters.
3.6.1 Dynamic Analysis Engine.
Increased hardware capability increases the potential to execute additional jobs in
parallel. This study utilizes available hardware to run 12 sandboxes in parallel. The
operating system affects certain specifics of the implementation, but not the general concept
under study [9]. This research uses a Dell server with two six-core Intel Xeon 2GHz
processors and 500GB system memory. The operating system is 64-bit Ubuntu 12.04
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Desktop (the sandbox environment requires the desktop version rather than the server
version).
Emulation or virtualization has various effects, but the investigation of the differences
of such effects is outside the scope of this study [9]. This study uses full operating system
virtualization with Oracle VirtualBox [22].
Various types of hooking capture API calls; Cuckoo Sandbox uses dynamic link
library (DLL) injection. The DLL injection method gets in the way of the test program
calling API calls and logs all the calls before forwarding them to the operating system.
Instruction-level tracing with data taint analysis captures behavior a different way, but an
experimental comparison between the methods is outside the scope of this study. Any
method that produces a MIST-compatible behavior report can contribute to this method.
Some publications do not report the dynamic analysis timeout, which is normally five
minutes. This methodology employs a 15 second timeout in order to increase throughput.
Comparing different timeouts is outside the scope of this study. The goal is to capture any
malicious behavior during processing, but some files take a long time to execute. This
study assumes that most malware completes malicious behavior quickly, within about five
seconds. The timeout is higher, at 15 seconds, in order to allow sandbox initialization and
the API hooking time to complete before the file executes. This assumption means that
the system does not detect malware that waits 15 seconds or more to execute malicious
behavior. However, even waiting for five minutes does not guarantee enough time to
discover all malicious behaviors. A malware author is able to evade a detection system
that has a particular timeout by finding out what the timeout is.
Multiple path analysis (MPA) might help solve the timeout problem. MPA
increases the potential to detect obfuscation and avoid long delays, but requires additional
computational time according to the branching factor of the file under analysis [20].
Experimenting with multiple path analysis is outside the scope of this study.
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3.6.2 Feature Generation Component.
MIST level 1 records API name and category, and level 2 adds generic argument
information (if present). Level 3 adds specific argument details. This study explores both
level 1 and level 2. The parameter q is the length of q-gram instruction sequences. Previous
studies use q = 2 or q = 4, and this study researches the effects of lengths from 1–16.
Feature selection uses information gain as a measurement of feature usefulness. The
system keeps the top 500 features (q-grams), which is the same as the number Kolter
and Maloof use as feature selection for training decision trees. Kolter and Maloof
find 68,744,909 distinct static n-grams from a set of 476 malicious executables and 561
benign executables, and hence select the top 500 of those n-grams [16].
However, as Section 4.1 reports, this method finds from 85–4,171 grams at MIST
level 1 and from 1,499,980–17,686,084 grams at level 2 although using a larger sample
set of 90,578 samples total. This method finds far fewer distinct grams because the MIST
behavior report gram space is more sparse than the binary file byte gram space in the static
experiments. Since keeping 500 out of 68 million works best for the static n-gram method
for Kolter and Maloof, then 500 should be sufficient out of 17 million features, since the
features go to the same machine learning technique (J48). In addition, each feature from
this behavior-based method potentially represents more information than arbitrary bytes
extracted from the binary file. Therefore, this method should not require more features
than the static n-gram method in order to represent useful information for the learning
algorithm. However, if fewer features would perform just as well as 500, then including
all 500 should only hinder computational burden and not classification accuracy. Therefore
investigating the effects of different feature space sizes is outside the scope of this study.
3.6.3 Machine Learning.
This study uses the Wakaito Environment for Knowledge Acquisition (WEKA) J48
implementation of the C4.5 decision tree learning algorithm [13]. This study uses 64,987
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malicious and 25,591 benign executable files, for a total set of 90,578 samples. The
malicious files come from a combination of malware sets from US-CERT and Open
Malware [25, 30]. The benign files come from known clean Microsoft Windows operating
system install media. The experiments use 10-fold stratified cross validation in order
to measure generality. Each machine learning algorithm sees the same set of folds per
repetition.
3.7 Factors
The factors for this experiment are the MIST level, the length of q-grams (q), and
whether or not the feature vectors undergo normalization. This experiment evaluates two
MIST levels: the level without any argument information and the level with partial, non-
specific, argument information. The levels of q range from 1 through 16. Gram lengths
longer than q = 16 lead to computationally prohibitive feature selection. The normalization
factor includes two levels: non-normalized, which leaves the feature vectors as vectors of
ones and zeros, and normalized, which applies basic vector normalization to project the
magnitude of the vector onto the unit circle while maintaining the direction. Several authors
mention these factors during similar research [2, 4, 16, 26].
Table 3.1: Factor Levels
Factor Levels
MIST level (l) 1 – API call name only
2 – API name and generic arguments
Length of q-grams (q) 1–16
Normalization Vector normalization (unit circle)
Not normalized (binary 0/1)
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3.8 Evaluation Technique
This experiment measures an instance of the CUT. Standard 10-fold cross-validation
measures the generality of each model.
A number of the dynamic analysis runs undergo manual validation. This practice
validates that the dynamic analysis component records malicious behavior.
3.9 Experimental Design
The methodology employs a full-factorial experimental design for a total of
2 × 16 × 2 = 64 experiments. Each experiment undergoes 10 repetitions to explore the
distribution variance in addition to the 10-fold cross validation, so each factor level
undergoes 100 runs total. The cross validation is stratified so that class distributions remain
similar throughout the process. Furthermore, each different experiment sees the same set
of cross validation folds so that the relative mix of samples does not affect the variation
in the results. Analysis uses a 99.9% confidence level to determine statistical significance.
Since the goal for false negative rates is less than 0.1%, measurements need to have enough
confidence to make a significant difference.
3.10 Methodology Summary
This method of malware detection involves detailed executable file classification. To
determine which of the selected factor levels performs best in this domain, each factor tests
on the same sample sets with the J48 learning algorithm. The input data are q-gram feature
vectors from MIST feature generation based on dynamic analysis reports. Any dynamic
analysis engine that can translate behavior reports into MIST format can compare to the
results of this study.
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter reports results and detailed analysis of the dynamic analysis engine, thefeature generation component, and the machine learning component by the 6,400
experiment runs. First, Section 4.1 covers feature selection. Next, Section 4.2 presents
the effects of the malware instruction set (MIST) level (l) and q-gram length (q) factors
on classifier performance. Then Section 4.2.2 contains the effect of normalization, and
Section 4.3 presents findings on the effective sample set size. Last, Section 4.6 analyzes
limitations of this research and dynamic analysis at large.
4.1 Feature Generation and Selection
After dynamic analysis of the 90,578 samples, there are 4,038 samples that do not
exhibit behavior. Table 4.1 displays the dynamic analysis results. Section 4.6 discusses
reasons for those 4.46% of samples not yielding behavior. The 86,540 samples that do
perform behavior, which make the other 95.54% of the total set, exhibit 85 different
application programming interface (API) calls. That is, at MIST level 1, there are 85
unique 1-grams in the behavior reports. For example, in the 1-gram 03 04, the number
03 refers to the filesystem category, and 04 refers to the MoveFile API call.
Table 4.1: Summary of dynamic analysis performance
Perform behavior 86,540 95.54%
Do not perform behavior 4,038 4.46%
Total 90,578 100.00%
Table 4.2 shows the relationship between the factor levels, the number of grams that
q-gram analysis finds in the behavior reports, and the theoretical number of possible grams
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Table 4.2: Detailed examples of feature generation component results
MIST q # grams theoretical space size % of space
1 1 85 120 70.83%
1 2 2,850 852 = 7, 225 39.45%
1 3 20,665 853 = 614, 125 3.36%
...
...
2 1 1,499,980 N/A* N/A*
2 2 3,722,381 1, 499, 9802 = 2.25 × 1015 1.65 × 10−7%
2 3 5,737,362 1, 499, 9803 = 3.37 × 1018 1.70 × 10−12%
...
...
* There is no formal limit on unique argument data.
for three examples from each MIST level. When q = 2, there are 2,850 unique 2-gram
sequences in the behavior reports, which is only 39.45% of the possible 2-long sequences
of those 85 API calls. For example, the gram 09 02 refers to the registry API call OpenKey,
and the gram 09 05 refers to the QueryValue API call which is also in the registry
category. Hence, the 2-gram 09 02, 09 05 refers to the behavior of opening a registry key
then querying a registry value. Without argument information, it is impossible to discern
whether the executable is querying the value of the key that it just opened or if the query
targets a different registry key.
As the value of q increases, the number of unique q-grams that occur in the behavior
reports also increases, but not as fast as the number of possible grams. Each additional entry
in a sequence multiplies the total possible number of permutations of grams by the number
of possibilities for that entry (e.g. 85 in this data set). Hence, 3-grams have 853 = 614, 125
possible unique values, and 4-grams have 854 = 52, 200, 625 possibilities. Thus the space
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of possible grams increases exponentially with gram length, but the grams that occur in the
data set do not fill up that space.
Figure 4.1: Graph of the number of millions of unique q-grams present in the data for each
level of the MIST level (l) and gram length (q) factors with depiction of the size of the
space of possible grams for MIST level 1
For MIST level 2, which records one level of function arguments, the number of
possible gram variations is much higher. There are 1,499,980 unique 1-grams within the
behavior reports of this data set at MIST level 2. This occurs because the arguments can be
any value that the program could provide to that API call. Figure 4.1 indicates that, as with
MIST level 1, the number of unique q-grams does not increase exponentially, but rather
appears to increase linearly (or logarithmically) as the value of q increases.
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4.2 Classifier Performance
This section reports that the MIST level factor contributes the largest effect to classifier
performance and normalization does not significantly affect performance with this data set.
The level of significance for the confidence intervals is 0.001 (i.e. 99.9% confidence that
the true mean falls within the interval).
4.2.1 Overview.
Figure 4.2 shows that MIST level 2 dominates level 1 on this data set. Over the
entire data set, MIST level 2 averaged an area under the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve (AUC) of 0.99106 ± 0.00065 at the 99.9% confidence level. The additional
information that MIST level 2 includes over level 1 appears to better inform the resulting
decision tree model. Additionally, 10 repetitions are clearly sufficient to characterize the
majority of the variation amongst runs of the algorithm on this data set. This could mean
that a lower number of repetitions would still prove sufficient in an operational environment
where saving computation time improves reaction time. The following subsections provide
more detailed analysis regarding the results of the experiments.
4.2.2 Normalization.
Figure 4.2 also shows that normalization does not attain a statistically significant effect
on classifier accuracy at the 99.9% confidence level (nor at 95% confidence). Machine
learning methods usually use normalization to reduce the bias of samples that contain a
larger proportion of features because normalizing sets the magnitude of each feature vector
to one without changing the direction of the vector.
Since normalization does not affect classification performance with this data set, then
either the classifier is not sensitive to sample vectors that have a comparatively large
magnitude, or the data set does not contain very many samples that yield large vectors. A
larger feature vector is the result of a sample that performs more behaviors that the feature
selection filter accepts. A data set does not fully demonstrate the normalization benefit if
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MIST level AUC 99.9% C.I.
1 0.9823 ±0.00045
2 0.9911 ±0.00065
Normalization AUC 99.9% C.I.
non-norm 0.9866 ±0.00068
norm 0.9868 ±0.00055
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Figure 4.2: Details and chart of area under ROC comparisons of classifier performance by
MIST level and normalization with 99.9% confidence intervals
there is a very small percentage of vectors with more attributes present compared to other
vectors.
4.2.3 MIST and q Details.
Figure 4.3 shows that MIST level 2 consistently performs at a higher AUC than MIST
level 1 except where the q-gram length reaches 15 and 16. MIST level 1 also reaches lows
at q = {15, 16}. The 99.9% confidence intervals validate that the differences between the
means are significant for the rest of the levels. Some potentially outlying data points include
q = {7, 15, 16} for both MIST levels 1 and 2 because each of those points are greatly lower
than the points around them. Further examination of those outlying results continues below
in Section 4.3. Appendix B provides tables with further details on measurements from each
experiment.
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Figure 4.3: Area under ROC comparison of classifier performance by MIST level and
q-gram length with 99.9% confidence intervals
4.3 Number of Samples
Of 90,578 samples total, 86,540 samples, 95.54%, yield behavior in this dynamic
methodology. Figure 4.4 shows that the number of samples steadily decreases as the levels
of the factors increases, which reveals that a large percentage of samples from the dynamic
analysis results lose representation at high MIST level and q-gram length.
There are more unique q-grams both when grams are longer and when adding
argument data. Thus, the 500 features that win selection comprises a much smaller
percentage of the set of all possible features. Hence many samples no longer contain a
selected behavior. This effect seems to be especially strong for q = {15, 16}.
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of resulting sample sizes by MIST level and gram length
The size of the sample set does not affect model performance as much as the amount
of information available from each sample. Figure 4.5 at first shows a slight positive
correlation between sample set size and classification accuracy for MIST level 1, however
there seems to be a compounding factor. The labels of the interesting points from Figure 4.3
indicate that the lowest performance coincides with the fewest available samples when
q = {15, 16}. Ignoring those outlying cases seems to reveal a slight positive correlation for
MIST level 1, but a slight negative correlation with MIST level 2. Therefore, a low sample
size adequately explains why learning performance is comparatively lower for q = {15, 16}.
However, sample size does not explain the low performance at q = 7, which is especially
pronounced in MIST level 2. On the other hand, false positives and false negatives are not
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out of the ordinary at q = 7, even though those values do change wildly with q = {15, 16}.
The same is true for classification accuracy by the percent correct measure.
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Figure 4.5: Performance with 99.9% confidence intervals according to sample set size after
removing zero-vectors with selected labels by MIST level (l) and q-gram length (q)
The increasing levels of the MIST and q-gram factors yield feature vector sets of
decreasing sizes because the methodology discards vectors that equal zero. Such vectors
do not provide useful information to a model because it represents an executable file
that exhibits no behavior. However, some files that do exhibit behavior end up with a
feature vector of zero because only 500 features survive feature selection. This feature size
parameter agrees with the number that Kolter and Maloof find useful for learning based
on static 4-grams [16]. The usefulness of this level of the parameter arises from both
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the learning algorithm and the implicit dimensionality of the input data. Although this
methodology differs from Kolter and Maloof regarding the source of the input data (the
implicit dimensionality may differ), the learning algorithm is the same. That is, since 500
features works for the decision tree algorithm of Kolter and Maloof, then it is feasible
that 500 features approximates a useful feature size for the decision trees in this study.
Kolter and Maloof find 68,744,909 distinct static n-grams from a set of 1037 samples
total, and hence select the top 500 of those n-grams [16]. However, this method finds
only 17,686,084 behavior q-grams using a sample set of 90,578 samples total. This method
finds far fewer distinct grams because the MIST behavior report gram space is more sparse
than the binary file byte gram space in the static experiments. Table 4.3 shows the selection
rates for the first three levels of q for MIST levels 1 and 2.
Table 4.3: Detailed examples of feature selection rates
MIST q # grams features % of grams
1 1 85 85 100.000%
1 2 2,850 500 17.544%
1 3 20,665 500 2.420%
...
...
2 1 1,499,980 500 0.0333%
2 2 3,722,381 500 0.0134%
2 3 5,737,362 500 0.0087%
...
...
Since keeping 500 out of 68 million works best for the static n-gram method for Kolter
and Maloof, then 500 could be sufficient out of 17 million features, since the features go
to the same J48 machine learning technique. This means that very similar feature vectors
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input to machine learning in both studies. In addition, each feature from this behavior-
based method potentially represents more information than arbitrary bytes extracted from
the binary file. Therefore, this method represents more semantic information per feature
than the static n-gram method.
Operationally, cyber operators should select a set of features that is large enough to
represent the number of unique behaviors that benign and malicious programs perform.
Then the machine learning algorithm discovers the relationship between the behaviors and
the maliciousness of executable files from the training samples.
4.4 Timing Analysis
The dynamic analysis component takes 12 days to generate behavior reports from
the 90,578 samples by running 12 parallel guests in Sub VirtualBox with Cuckoo Sandbox
on a Dell server with two six-core Intel Xeon 2GHz processors and 500GB system memory
on Ubuntu 12.04. The analysis timeout is 15 seconds, but each sample experiences
an additional 54 seconds of overhead on average. The overhead mainly results from
processing large behavior report files from executables that log a large number of API
calls. Optimizing the dynamic analysis process for speed is outside the scope of this study
because commercial dynamic analysis products solve this problem.
Translating a generic behavior report out of a dynamic analysis engine into the MIST
format takes less than a second for small reports, and operates in time proportional to
the length of the behavior report. Extracting the q-grams out of the MIST reports takes
2.4 minutes at MIST level 1 and q = 1, and it takes 6.9 hours for MIST level 2 with q = 16.
Naturally, this processing time is proportional to the number and size of grams.
Training decision tree models with the Wakaito Environment for Knowledge
Acquisition (WEKA) J48 implementation of the C4.5 algorithm on the 6400 experiment
runs takes 81 days worth of computational time [23]. Using 20 parallel processes on the
same hardware as above takes 4 days in the WEKA experimenter [13].
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The dynamic analysis component and the experiments together take 16 days to run on
these 90,578 samples. In an operational environment where time matters, a commercial
dynamic analysis component could process 50,000 samples or more per day depending
on the available level of investment in the enterprise for definitive malware detection.
Furthermore, if only eight levels of parameters need exploration, and the number of
repetitions can be less than 10, then training a detection model can take under one hour.
After building the model, each suspicious sample undergoes dynamic analysis, which
takes 79 seconds on average during this study, then the resulting behavior report uses the
same MIST global settings as the training set for translating into the MIST format. Then
q-gram extraction uses the same indices as the training set to create a feature vector for
the sample, which provides an input to the detection model. A decision tree classifies
input in logarithmic time relative to the size of the tree, which averages 0.043 seconds of
computational time during the experiments in this study.
Therefore, if an enterprise accomplishes this analysis method with a baseline of their
approved software along with a set of malware that includes current threats, then they
can have a functioning detection model in two business days. Then the dynamic analysis
component and the model can classify suspicious samples at a rate of 35 samples per hour
(again assuming commercial processing of 50,000 per day).
4.5 Operational Analysis
The information that a machine learning algorithm encodes into a model intrinsically
comes from the input data. Therefore, the degree to which a model correctly reflects the real
world depends on how representatively the input data captures relevant information about
the real world goals. In a malware behavior model, an ideal data set contains samples
that exhibit all the malicious behaviors to which an enterprise cyber infrastructure (ECI)
is vulnerable. On the other hand, the machine learning algorithm consumes computational
resources for each instance in the input data, so the ideal sample size for input data is
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the number of samples that completely contains the necessary malicious behavior sets
without any duplicates of those behavior sets. However, fully identifying such a set requires
complete behavior analysis of the entire available set, including all unknown malware
behaviors from the future of a given ECI. Such a requirement takes the computational
cost of obtaining the training set from high to impossible. On the other hand, a nearly
complete set maintains usefulness so long as it contains sufficient behavior sets to identify
some of the malware present in an ECI, which allows cyber operators to target different
techniques capable of discovering additional malware.
The top 10 false positive rates of the data sets appear in Table 4.4. The lowest average
false positive rate is 1.75%, achieved by MIST level 2 with q = 4. The top-performing data
sets q = {13, 14} appear next, followed by some shorter grams. All 10 come from MIST
level 2.
Considering an example operation on an enclave network, suppose there are 10,000
executable files on hosts in the enclave. A team of eight cyber analysts deploy to the
enclave in response to indications of an intrusion, and indeed there are 100 malware files
hidden somewhere on the enclave. If each of the 8 cyber analysts can process 25 files per
day, then to manually inspect 10,100 files it would normally take 10,100/25/8 = 50.5 days
to find the malware. Assuming that the average accuracy of 99.4% and false positive rate
of 2.2% of the MIST level 2 and q = 14 model applies to the example operational file
set, this method would falsely classify 10,000 × 0.022 = 220 benign files as malicious and
detect 100×0.994 = 99 malicious files. The team of analysts can now process the 319 files
manually and find all but one of the malware in 319/25/8 = 1.6 days, which is over a 97%
workload reduction.
Expanding this concept to the next level, consider a fast malware detection method,
such as the static component of the Dube malware target recognition (MaTR) architecture.
Dube’s static method reaches 99.9% detection with a 0.1% false positive rate [7]. Given
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Table 4.4: Top 10 Data Sets by False Positive Rate (FPR) at the 99.9% confidence interval
(C.I.)
MIST q N FPR std. dev. std. err. 99.9% C.I.
2 4 200 0.0175 0.003857 0.000273 ± 0.0009
2 14 200 0.0220 0.006167 0.000436 ± 0.0015
2 13 200 0.0239 0.007015 0.000496 ± 0.0017
2 2 200 0.0264 0.005332 0.000377 ± 0.0013
2 1 200 0.0283 0.004529 0.000320 ± 0.0011
2 3 200 0.0302 0.006037 0.000427 ± 0.0014
2 5 200 0.0327 0.008630 0.000610 ± 0.0020
2 6 200 0.0338 0.006561 0.000464 ± 0.0015
2 10 200 0.0372 0.008177 0.000578 ± 0.0019
2 12 200 0.0383 0.008639 0.000611 ± 0.0020
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these rates, the same team of eight cyber analysts as in the previous example in two days
could find the malware from the intrusion in a set of 10,000/0.001 = 10,000,000 files.
The operational result above assumes that the malware detection methods operate
independently of each other. That is, the methods do not use the same information from
the data set in order to make predictions. Dube’s MaTR static method relies on a set of
static features, such as structure anomalies, but a dynamic method like the one analyzed in
this thesis relies on the actual observed behavior of the files. Those information sets arise
from independent analysis methods. Figure 4.6 shows an example of two independent
classifiers attempting to detect malware from an intrusion on a cyber infrastructure. The
outside box represents all the executable files on the network, and the circles for classifiers
A and B show the files that each is able to classify. The dotted line depicts a decision
boundary, and the wavy lines show what each model classifies as malware. The labels
show the relationships between false positives and false negatives. A false positive occurs
when a model classifies a benign sample as malicious, which means that a higher level
must spend extra resources validating that sample. The false positive rate of the MaTR
architecture reveals a measurement of wasted overhead by the malware analysts. A false
negative occurs when a model classifies a malicious sample as benign, which means the
adversary retains the capability of that malicious executable.
The goal for organizing malware triage is to get all the malware within the wavy lines
while pulling the overlap of the classifiers A and B apart as much as possible to reduce
false positives. In practice, most classifiers do not leave many samples unclassified, so the
circles would expand to fill in most of the box.
One exception to independence could be if the static method uses embedded dynamic
link library (DLL) import strings as features, which relates to the possible API calls that
the file could call. However, this behavior analysis feature generation component includes
argument information that is not as available to a static method. In addition, the feature
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Figure 4.6: Venn diagram of independent malware classifiers
generation component considers a sequence of API calls, which would likely not be in
the same order as listed in the imports. Therefore the main limitation on a powerful
synergy between two independent methods in such an architecture is how closely the
models perform with an operational data set rather than the more widely available data
sets that academic studies use.
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4.6 Limitations Analysis
The malware detection system has some limitations. There exist limitations in the
malware set workload, the dynamic analysis method, and feature extraction and selection.
4.6.1 Malware Set Limitations.
This malware set comes from USCERT and Open Malware [25, 30]. The set contains
a wide variety of types of malware, such as worms, downloaders and backdoors, and the
set contains a wide variety of families within each type. Because the set contains a large
number of malware samples, the members collectively exhibit a large number of malicious
behaviors. The fact that the data only exhibit 85 of the possible 120 API calls raises
questions of completeness. While some API calls are not often useful to routine types
of programs, future research should validate that the training set covers enough different
behaviors to be fully useful for training malware detection models. Other studies show
that malware families usually perform similar behaviors, so whichever variants randomly
appear in the training set contribute to the available training information for the learning
algorithm. It is possible that a large malware family randomly present in the training set
could introduce a bias toward detecting that family, however if such a family is more
prevalent in the wild then detecting that family is a desirable trait. Operationally, cyber
defenders should tailor the training set to the types of threats that face the particular
enterprise.
4.6.2 Dynamic Analysis Limitations.
Not all executable files exhibit behavior during dynamic analysis. Several reasons
contribute to this limitation, and this method discards all such samples. First, the operating
system does not execute corrupted files that break operating system conventions. Despite
the malware author’s intentions, no malicious behavior executes in this case.
Second, some executable files require provision of command-line arguments, the
presence of an encryption key, or to read from a configuration file or a DLL. Incident
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response possesses the capability to discover such items and input them into the dynamic
analysis process for newer samples. Then the dynamic analysis process can call malicious
functions of a DLL file. These examples demonstrate the importance of additional domain-
specific information to improve malware detection operationally.
Some malware samples attempt to evade analysis by failing to exhibit malicious
behavior. Such samples evade the method in this study. However, in a growing trend,
many ECIs include virtualized servers and workstations where such samples also fail
to perform malicious behavior. Other malware samples evade analysis by targeting the
dynamic methodology. Lindorfer et al. suggest a mitigation by sending suspicious samples
through a gauntlet of methodologies [18]. There remains the case where malware authors
specifically design an executable file to evade such a defense (e.g. when adversaries
have specific intelligence), and cyber operators must detect this intrusion from a different
perspective (e.g. network traffic anomaly analysis). Moser et al. presents an additional
mitigation with multi-path analysis [20]. This technique exploits instruction trace dynamic
analysis by following both possible paths at every branch. Multi-path analysis suffers from
performance concerns, but exposes more behaviors of an executable file.
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V. Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the research conclusions and significance. Section 5.1 startswith a summary of conclusions on the research followed by the significance of the
research in Section 5.2. Finally, Section 5.3 offers suggestions for future work on related
subjects. Following this chapter are appendices that provide an additional level of detail
of experimental results. Appendix A shows some of the top results sorted by different
measurements, and Appendix B provides a summary of the results of all 64 experiments.
5.1 Research Conclusions
This research provides insight into the effect of malware instruction set (MIST) level,
q-gram length, and normalization factors on feature selection of behavior reports for
machine learning performance. Including generic argument information with MIST level 2
improves the classification accuracy of a decision tree learner on this data set. Additionally,
the performance of the model should increase operationally with additional benign samples
from the enterprise environment. The normalization factor is not significant with this data
set, and would only significantly improve classification of data sets that include samples
which exhibit a wider variety of different behaviors.
The size of samples available for model training after dropping zero-vectors depends
on the number of unique grams which gram analysis discovers. Therefore, cyber defenders
employing a similar method must include an appropriate number of features for the data
so that the feature vectors represent more samples. Increasing the number of features also
increases the machine learning computational requirements, so operators must choose a
scheme that performs adequately on the available computing resources. This thesis covers
a number of considerations for cyber defenders to prudently design a malware detection
45
system, including the following summary. Cyber defenders using a malware detection
system must:
• match the analysis sandbox environment to the enterprise environment as closely as
possible,
• tailor the training set to the types of threats that face the particular enterprise,
• select a set of features that is large enough to represent the number of unique
behaviors that benign and malicious programs perform,
• use an efficient dynamic analysis component depending on the available level of
investment,
• experiment with around eight levels of parameters when retraining,
• keep the number of training validation repetitions less than 10 (e.g. use 3 or 1),
• analyze the independence of the methods in different malware target recognition
(MaTR) tiers, and
• add additional domain-specific information to the model (as possible).
These suggestions are not exhaustive, but they follow from the experiments of this
thesis. Of course, cyber operators should keep up to date on other research in the field to
continue to proactively adapt to changing threats.
5.2 Research Significance
This research contributes to the body of knowledge available to researchers studying
malware detection and operators employing a malware detection system. This study
contributes valuable insight to a hierarchical cyber defense organization, such as Dube’s
MaTR, where a three-tiered malware triage structure funnels a large number of unknown
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executable files up to the human analyst tier [7]. The bottom tier consists of fast malware
detection methods, such as static analysis methods. The bottom tier must not permit a high
false negative rate, but it may admit a moderate false positive rate because the middle tier
should reduce false positives.
The middle tier includes slower methods, such as dynamic analysis, which require
time to emulate or simulate execution. The role of the middle tier is to decrease the number
of false positives to send to the top tier, so the detection methods must be independent
to those in the bottom tier. If the methods in the middle are not independent, then they
would produce nearly the same results on the same input. However, an independent
method produces different results such that the predictions of both methods cover the same
malware (according to accuracy), but cover different false positives. Automatic behavior
analysis is independent to static n-gram analysis because behavior analysis directly detects
the malicious behavior rather than arbitrary byte strings.
Following is a summary of contributions of this thesis:
• critical analysis of recent automatic malware analysis research including a compari-
son to this study (Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4),
• analysis and discussion of results from 64 experiments on 3 key parameters of
behavior analysis feature generation that the literature does not cover in a detailed
manner (Chapter 4), and
• analysis of the contribution to a malware target recognition architecture by this
dynamic analysis method, which establishes the feasibility of automatic behavior
analysis at the enterprise scale (Sections 4.5 and 5.2).
As Section 4.4 discusses, if an enterprise accomplishes this analysis method in
addition to a method with similar performance to Dube’s static method with a baseline
of their approved software along with a set of malware that includes current threats, then
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they can have functioning static and dynamic detection models within two business days
after constructing the system and gathering the training samples. Such a malware target
recognition (MaTR) can change the game of malware triage in favor of cyber defenders at
enterprise cyber infrastructures (ECIs) in government, business and academia.
5.3 Future Work Recommendations
The following subsections describe considerations for future malware analysis
researchers who investigate automatic behavior analysis starting with data set issues in
Section 5.3.1. Next, Section 5.3.2 discusses additional machine learning algorithms, and
lastly Section 5.3.3 addresses feature selection.
5.3.1 Data Set Issues.
The data set proves extremely important to a machine learning scheme. In order
to ensure that the trained model learns information regarding current malware behavior,
the input data set malware must remain current. Theoretically, by including all malicious
behaviors the behavior model includes all relevant information, and the model detects all
germane malware.
Every application that exists on a given ECI contains executable files. Each additional
behavior that contributes to a behavior model increases the ability of a model to correctly
classify an executable file that exhibits similar behavior. Cyber defenders must identify
applications present on a specific ECI and include representative executable files to enable
appropriate model training. This methodology uses 32-bit Windows XP SP3 virtual guests,
and includes operating system files from Windows 2000 to Windows 7. A current limitation
of the Cuckoo Sandbox configuration pushes the ability to operate 64-bit guests outside
the scope of this research, but the Cuckoo Sandbox developer intend to provide 64-bit
capability in the future. In an operational environment, cyber defenders implementing this
method must match the sandbox environment to the enterprise environment as closely as
possible. Any differences between the tests and the operational workstations could mean
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that executable files behave differently, which could increase the chances of missing a
malware sample in the wild.
The malware comes from a source that includes a wide variety of malware. Additional
work to identify original sources of malware samples enables more accurate labeling and
more specific classification training. Researchers could use method similar to this to
attempt to categorically identify generic malicious behaviors that provide insight to the
unique malicious behaviors that exist in the wild. This would enable building very accurate
and efficient models.
5.3.2 Machine Learning Algorithms.
Different machine learning algorithms produce different types of models. Certain
algorithmic heuristics discover the ideal information from the input data [33]. On the other
hand, discovering a better performing learning algorithm for a given data set requires a
substantial research effort. Decision trees are sufficient to classify whiteware and malware
relative to a data set. Ensemble learning methods prove effective to improve adequate-
performing learning algorithms [17]. Again, pilot studies for this research show that
decision trees perform better than bagging or boosting decision stumps and similarly to
bagging or boosting decision trees. Ensembles of decision stumps train more quickly than
decision trees, but decision trees train faster than ensembles of decision trees because each
ensemble trains 10 models internally. Future work could investigate ensembles of smaller
decision trees than normal, but not as small as decision stumps, which just have one level.
Algorithms such as support vector machine (SVM) and perceptrons find applications
in other fields, but decision trees attain high accuracy in malware classification without the
need for the high computational cost of other robust algorithms.
5.3.3 Feature Selection.
The scope of these experiments covers 500 features according to information gain.
While this number covers the useful distinctions between malware and non-malware with
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some probability, attaining higher probability requires additional features. Some samples
do not exhibit any behavior that scores as high an information gain as the feature selection
set. Then the feature vector for such a sample contains all zeros. This method discards
such samples, so any behavior that the sample exhibits does not contribute to the detection
model. Increasing the number of features decreases the number of thusly unrepresented
samples. This decrease demonstrates a bias of the feature selection method for behaviors
that a larger number of samples exhibit along classification lines. In this case, multiple
behaviors that correctly correspond to classes identity the same group of samples, but a
smaller group of samples does not contribute as highly.
Future study should investigate alternate feature selection schemes and parameters.
Using principal component analysis could be a different way to rank the dimensions from
the generated feature set. A differently-sized feature selection set could affect classifier
performance. For example, including more than 500 features provides more information to
the learning model. However, more input features requires more computational resources
to build the model. One approach could be to select a varied number of features based on
the number of q-grams that exist in the behavior reports.
However, this study shows that machine learning algorithms can learn an accurate
model when the number of features is small compared to the number of possible features.
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Appendix A: Top 10 Performance Results
Table A.1: Top 10 Data Sets by Classifier Performance according to the Area under ROC
(AUC) at the 99.9% confidence interval (C.I.)
MIST q N AUC std. dev. std. err. 99.9% C.I.
2 13 200 0.998137 0.001189 0.000084 ± 0.000281
2 14 200 0.997943 0.001055 0.000075 ± 0.000249
2 12 200 0.997883 0.001054 0.000075 ± 0.000249
2 11 200 0.997817 0.001072 0.000076 ± 0.000253
2 6 200 0.996767 0.001179 0.000083 ± 0.000278
2 10 200 0.995889 0.003728 0.000264 ± 0.000881
2 1 200 0.995805 0.003423 0.000242 ± 0.000809
2 5 200 0.992861 0.003221 0.000228 ± 0.000761
2 4 200 0.992662 0.002849 0.000201 ± 0.000673
2 8 200 0.992503 0.006521 0.000461 ± 0.001540
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Table A.2: Top 10 Data Sets by Classifier Performance according to the Percent Correct at
the 99.9% confidence interval (C.I.)
MIST q N % correct std. dev. std. err. 99.9% C.I.
2 13 200 99.3819 0.131649 0.009309 ± 0.0311
2 14 200 99.3696 0.120930 0.008551 ± 0.0286
2 10 200 99.3255 0.120874 0.008547 ± 0.0285
2 4 200 99.2708 0.110091 0.007785 ± 0.0260
2 8 200 99.2180 0.142474 0.010074 ± 0.0336
2 2 200 99.1946 0.114426 0.008091 ± 0.0270
2 9 200 99.1835 0.127091 0.008987 ± 0.0300
2 12 200 99.1808 0.151388 0.010705 ± 0.0358
2 11 200 99.1552 0.167846 0.011868 ± 0.0396
2 7 200 99.1536 0.144591 0.010224 ± 0.0341
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Table A.3: Significance of MIST Level by Factor Levels, sorted ascending by AUC of
MIST level 1 from left to right then top to bottom
q norm MIST level 1 2 q norm MIST level 1 2
1 full 97.7033 99.0775 ◦ 1 norm 97.7273 99.0997 ◦
6 full 97.8300 99.0102 ◦ 5 full 97.8723 99.0265 ◦
2 full 97.8810 99.1275 ◦ 3 full 97.8850 98.8098 ◦
2 norm 97.9027 99.2616 ◦ 5 norm 97.9083 99.1942 ◦
6 norm 97.9093 99.1538 ◦ 7 full 97.9387 99.0953 ◦
3 norm 97.9478 98.9784 ◦ 14 full 97.9734 99.3966 ◦
4 full 97.9979 99.2236 ◦ 8 full 98.0128 99.1727 ◦
7 norm 98.0345 99.2119 ◦ 9 full 98.0430 99.1759 ◦
4 norm 98.0480 99.3179 ◦ 13 full 98.0738 99.3832 ◦
14 norm 98.0757 99.3427 ◦ 12 full 98.0785 99.1723 ◦
11 full 98.1033 99.1149 ◦ 10 full 98.1209 99.3015 ◦
13 norm 98.1301 99.3807 ◦ 12 norm 98.1346 99.1893 ◦
8 norm 98.1516 99.2634 ◦ 11 norm 98.1671 99.1956 ◦
9 norm 98.1979 99.1910 ◦ 10 norm 98.2148 99.3495 ◦
15 full 98.9178 99.0332 16 full 98.9530 98.9768
15 norm 99.0416 99.0569 16 norm 99.1217 98.9485
◦ statistically significant improvement, 0.001 significance
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Table A.4: Significance of Normalization by Factor Levels, sorted ascending by AUC of
Non-norm from left to right then top to bottom
MIST level q Non-norm Normalized MIST level q Non-norm Normalized
1 1 97.7033 97.7273 1 6 97.8300 97.9093
1 5 97.8723 97.9083 1 2 97.8810 97.9027
1 3 97.8850 97.9478 1 7 97.9387 98.0345
1 14 97.9734 98.0757 ◦ 1 4 97.9979 98.0480
1 8 98.0128 98.1516 ◦ 1 9 98.0430 98.1979 ◦
1 13 98.0738 98.1301 1 12 98.0785 98.1346
1 11 98.1033 98.1671 1 10 98.1209 98.2148
2 3 98.8098 98.9784 ◦ 1 15 98.9178 99.0416
1 16 98.9530 99.1217 ◦ 2 16 98.9768 98.9485
2 6 99.0102 99.1538 ◦ 2 5 99.0265 99.1942 ◦
2 15 99.0332 99.0569 2 1 99.0775 99.0997
2 7 99.0953 99.2119 ◦ 2 11 99.1149 99.1956
2 2 99.1275 99.2616 ◦ 2 12 99.1723 99.1893
2 8 99.1727 99.2634 2 9 99.1759 99.1910
2 4 99.2236 99.3179 ◦ 2 10 99.3015 99.3495
2 13 99.3832 99.3807 2 14 99.3966 99.3427
◦ statistically significant improvement, 0.001 significance
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Appendix B: Experiment Result Details
This appendix includes the detailed results from the 64 experiments. The following
list contains the definitions of the column headings in each of the four tables:
• norm – normalization
• q – gram length
• l – malware instruction set (MIST) level
• #tng – number of training samples
• #test – number of testing samples
• %acc – percent correct
• AUC – area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
• FPR – false positive rate
• FNR – false negative rate
• TP – number of true positives
• FP – number of false positives
• TN – number of true negatives
• FN – number of false negatives
• tng (s) – user CPU time training (seconds)
• test (s) – user CPU time testing (seconds)
• size (b) – serialized model size (bytes)
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